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Abstract
According to Gibrat’s Law of Proportionate Effect, the growth rate of a given firm is independent
of its size at the beginning of the period examined. In contrast to the previous literature on the
subject, this paper seeks to test the Law by taking account of both the entry process and the role of
survival/failure in reshaping a given population of firms over time. It does so by focusing on the
entire population of firms (including newborn ones) in the Italian Radio, TV &
Telecommunications equipment industry and tracking them over seven years. Consistently with the
previous literature, it finds that - in general - Gibrat’s Law is to be rejected, since smaller firms tend
to grow faster than their larger counterparts. However, the paper’s main finding is that this rejection
of Gibrat’s Law may be due to market dynamics and selection. In other words, it is due to the entry
process and the presence of transient smaller firms. Indeed, whilst it is found that Gibrat’s Law has
to be rejected over a seven-year period during which both incumbent and newborn firms are
considered, for both sub-populations of surviving firms a convergence towards Gibrat-like behavior
over time can be detected. Thus, market selection “cleans” the original population of firms and the
resulting industrial “core” (mature, larger, well-established and most efficient firms) does not seem
to depart from a Gibrat-like pattern of growth.
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2Introduction
The debate on Gibrat’s Law of Proportionate Effect is a rather old one (see, amongst others, the
surveys by Sutton, 1997; Geroski, 1999; Lotti et al., 2003). A commonly accepted interpretation of
the Law formulated by Robert Gibrat (1931) is that the growth rate of a given firm is independent
of its size at the beginning of the period examined. In other words, “the probability of a given
proportionate change in size during a specified period is the same for all firms in a given industry -
regardless of their size at the beginning of the period” (Mansfield, 1962, p. 1031).
From an empirical viewpoint, the Law can be tested in two ways: either by using a sample of
firms continuously active during a given period (balanced panel analysis), or by using a population
of firms and testing the Law with sample attrition taken into account, since a portion of firms alive
at the beginning of the period do not survive until the end of the same period (unbalanced panel
analysis).1 Both approaches have some shortcomings. Tracking only incumbent surviving firms is
by definition equivalent to considering only a sub-sample of the firms’ population and to neglecting
important elements of industrial dynamics, i.e. entries and failures. If Gibrat’s Law is not a feature
of the best incumbent firms, but a general pattern of industrial dynamics, it should be tested over
the entire population of firms in a given time span (with the inclusion of new entries and firms that
may exit the market in the subsequent periods). It is probably for this reason that the most recent
estimates of the Law2 have used the second methodology. Yet, neither in this case do most studies
specifically consider newborn firms and they deal with the survival/failure phenomenon by taking
account only of sample attrition due to exit. Most of previous studies, in fact, pool large
incumbents, newborn firms and small transient firms together, although estimates over a given time
period are corrected for sample bias.
By contrast, this paper attempts to consider both the entry process and the role of selection
mechanisms in reshaping a given population of firms over time. It consequently differs from the
previous literature in that it tries 1) to take joint account of both incumbents and newborn firms and
2) to consider the selection process as it occurs both over the entire period and year by year.
Repeating the test of Gibrat’s Law year by year enables one to consider what happens when the
original heterogeneous population is gradually reshaped in favor of larger, most efficient and well-
established firms. Indeed, whilst most of the previous literature has found that Gibrat’s law must be
rejected, since smaller firms tend to grow faster than their larger counterparts, no previous study
                                                
1 Fotopoulos and Louri (2001) is an example of the first approach, and Goddard, Wilson, and Blandon (2002) of the
second.
2 See for example Becchetti and Trovato (2002), Hesmathi (2001), Fotopoulos and Louri (2001), Almus and Nerlinger
(2000), Harhoff et al. (1998).
3has attempted to determine whether this result is robust once industrial dynamics are taken fully
into account. More specifically, in this paper we deal with the Italian Radio, TV &
Telecommunications equipment industry in January 1987 (including 122 newborn firms). During
the period examined, this industry was a rather mature one in Italy and still lagging behind in the
technological revolution brought about by the passage from analog to digital signals.3 Many small
firms in the industry operated in one of its three sub-markets, whereas only a few large multi-
product firms competed against each other in all of those sub-markets. Consequently, this study is
affected by a certain degree of arbitrariness in its definition of the industry’s boundaries which,
according to Sutton (1998), is likely to make it impossible to take account of the fact that each
industry contains a number of sub-markets between which rivalry is less intense than it is within
each (cf. also Giorgetti, 2003; Roberts and Thompson, 2003). Nonetheless, it is less severely
affected by this arbitrariness than are studies which focus on several different industries. Gibrat’s
Law is tested by using a sample selection procedure (augmented with age) for all firms, incumbent
firms and newborn firms respectively, both over the entire period (1987-1994) and year by year.
This set of estimates will enable us to answer the following questions:
a) Is Gibrat’s Law valid in general (that is for all firms and over the entire period)?
b) Is Gibrat’s Law less valid for new entries than for incumbent firms (smaller sub-optimal
firms are relatively more common among new entries)?
c) Is there any convergence towards a Gibrat’s like pattern of growth over time (due to market
selection particularly adverse against smaller firms)?
The empirical findings support the following string of answers: NO/YES/YES.
Our interpretation is that previous results rejecting Gibrat’s Law have been partially determined
by incomplete consideration of the entry and selection processes. More specifically, Gibrat’s Law
fails to hold because a given population of firms is characterized by the presence of both newborn
firms and “fragile” firms (which will subsequently fail). Smaller firms are over-represented in both
categories, but it is precisely the presence of smaller fast-growing firms that leads to the rejection of
Gibrat’s Law. As a result of market selection, surviving larger firms tend to behave in accordance
with Gibrat’s Law and this holds for both incumbents and newborn firms. Hence, if these results are
correct, and if they are confirmed by other studies, Gibrat’s Law and industrial dynamics are
interrelated and it is incorrect either to assume or to deny Gibrat’s Law a priori. Although the Law
is not confirmed in general, it may be an accurate representation of the pattern of growth assumed
                                                
3 In fact, the leading Italian firms in the industry proved unable to cope with this technological revolution, with a
consequent contraction of the entire industry in the following years. In this connection, the Italian Radio, TV &
4by a mature population of well-established firms, that is, a population already selected by market
forces.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the dataset and deals with some
methodological issues related to the estimation of Gibrat’s Law; Section 3 discusses the
econometric results and Section 4 summarizes the main findings of the study.
2.  Data and methodology
In this paper we use a unique data set from the Italian National Institute for Social Security (INPS).
This data set identifies all incumbents and newborn firms with at least one paid employee in the
Radio, TV & Telecommunication equipment industry in Italy, and tracks their employment
performance at yearly intervals from January 1987 to January 1994.4 The original INPS file was
checked in order to identify entry and failure times correctly and to detect inconsistencies in
individual tracks due to administrative factors, and cancellations due to firm transfers, mergers and
take-overs. This cleaning procedure reduced the total number of firms in the database to 3,285, of
which 122 were new entries in January 1987.
The central relationship tested in this study is the original logarithmic specification of the Law:
log Si,t = β0 + β1 log Si,t-1 + εi,t (1)
where Si t,  is the size of firm i at time t, Si t, −1 is the size of the same firm in the previous period
and εi,t is a random variable distributed independently of Si t, −1. Following Chesher (1979, p.404), if
both sides of equation (1) are exponentiated, it becomes clear that if β1 is equal to unity, then
growth rate and initial size are independently distributed5 and Gibrat’s Law is in operation. By
contrast, if β1 < 1 smaller firms grow at a systematically higher rate than do their larger
counterparts, while the opposite is the case if β1 > 1. If - as in the majority of previous studies -
growth and exit are not treated as homogeneous phenomena (that is, on the disputable hypothesis
                                                                                                                                                                 
Telecommunication industry can be regarded, in the period under examination, as an aging one.
4 All private Italian firms are obliged to pay national security contributions for their employees to INPS. Consequently,
the registration of a new firm as “active” signals an entry into the market, while the cancellation of a firm denotes an
exit from it (this happens when a firm finally stops paying national security contributions). For administrative reasons -
delays in payment, for instance, or uncertainty about the actual status of the firm - cancellation may sometimes be
preceded by a period during which the firm is “suspended”. The present paper considers these suspended firms as
exiting from the market at the moment of their transition from the status of “active” to that of “suspended”, while firms
which have halted operations only temporarily during the follow-up period, and which were “active” in January 1994,
have been treated as survivors.
5 Following a random walk (with drift) stochastic process.
5that exit is equal to a minus one rate of growth), empirical estimates need only deal with surviving
firms, obtaining results conditional on survival.
Let χi,t be an indicator function which takes value 1 if firm i is still alive at time t and 0
otherwise. Accordingly, observed data on firm size can give only the conditional expectation of Si,t
given Si,t-1 and χi,t=1, i.e. according to our specification,
( ) ( )1,|log1,| ,1,,1,10,1,, =++== −−− tititititititi SESSSE χεββχ (2)
If the conditional expectation of εt is zero, the regression function for the selected sub-sample is
the same as the population regression function, the only drawback being a loss of efficiency due to
the smaller number of observations available. But if this is not true, the last term of equation (2)
need to be included in the regression function. It is for this reason that a rule for χt is required, and
the most natural way to deal with this kind of selection is to use a survival equation (i.e. a probit
model), given that we can exactly identify when a firm exits the market. In a more general
formulation, this is the same as saying that:
Prob(χi=1) =
Φ(α’zi)
Probit Selection Equation          (3a){
yi = β’ xi + εi observed only if χi=1         (3b)
If we denote the residual of equation (3a) with µi,t and if we assume that the error terms are
normal, respectively ( )εσε ,0~ Ni  and ( )µσµ ,0~ Ni  with ( ) ρµε =iicorr , , we can reformulate
equation (2) as:
( ) ititititi SSSE λρσββχ ε++== −− 1,10,1,, log1,| (4)
where 
( )
( )i
i
i z
z
'
'
α
αφλ Φ=  is the inverse of the Mills’ ratio.6 The two-step estimation procedure
requires one to estimate the probit selection model first. Once λi has been obtained for each
observation, the growth equation (4) is estimated, augmenting the observations with the Mills’ ratio
                                                
6 We use Φ to denote the cumulative density function of the Normal distribution and φ to denote its density function.
6inverse, to obtain an additional parameter estimate εσρβ ˆˆ=M  from which we can simply recover
the two-step estimate of 
εσ
βρ
ˆ
ˆ M= . We used Maximum Likelihood estimation7 with
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
Table 1 – Number of Active Firms, Average Size and its Standard Deviation.
ALL FIRMS
Year Number of ActiveFirms
Average Size of
Surviving Firms Standard Deviation
1987 3285 35.99 285.14
1988 3216 37.07 277.46
1989 2893 44.34 343.17
1990 2743 44.89 337.04
1991 2564 46.10 336.10
1992 2347 45.11 368.56
1993 2149 46.31 346.37
1994 1933 45.83 378.60
INCUMBENTS
Year Number of ActiveFirms
Average Size of
Surviving Firms Standard Deviation
1987 3163 36.94 290.43
1988 3095 37.97 282.61
1989 2786 45.36 349.46
1990 2646 45.81 342.89
1991 2476 47.00 341.73
1992 2265 46.00 374.84
1993 2078 47.18 352.00
1994 1871 46.76 384.66
NEWBORN  FIRMS
Year Number of ActiveFirms
Average Size of
Surviving Firms Standard Deviation
1987 122 11.38 41.61
1988 121 14.10 52.70
1989 107 17.55 61.11
1990 97 19.82 67.45
1991 88 20.74 70.39
1992 81 20.12 67.90
1993 71 20.83 65.76
1994 62 17.76 54.91
Consistently with most previous studies, both the main and the selection equations were
augmented with the age variable (which is obviously only relevant to incumbent firms).
                                                
7 Since Heckman's (1979) estimator may be inefficient and biased for small samples.
7Regressions were run separately for all firms, all firms with a dummy for newborn ones, only
incumbent firms and only newborn firms. The same specifications were tested over the entire
period (1987-1994) and year by year (7 separate estimates for each group of firms). The descriptive
statistics in table 1 confirm the importance of market selection: only 59% of incumbents and 51%
of newborn firms survive until the end of the 7 years period. This selection, as it is evident from the
average sizes of surviving firms, is dramatically biased towards smaller firms (especially in the first
years).
3. Results
Tables 2 and following present the regressions results over the entire period examined (1987-1994)
and year by year. The model specification is reported in the headline, while coefficients estimates
are presented together with robust standard errors and level of statistical significance (*=90%;
**=95%; ***=99%). Estimates of the Gibrat’s coefficient β1 are also coupled with a Wald test,
whose null is β1=1 (that is the Law is not rejected). After the coefficients estimates of the sample
equation have been presented, some overall diagnostic tests are reported, among which the estimate
of the correlation between the residuals of the two models (ρ) and the related significance level of
the corresponding Likelihood Ratio test,8 and a Wald test for the overall validity of the model. As
can be seen from all tables, the need for the sample selection model has been confirmed, especially
in the first years of the period examined. Finally, the reader can follow the market selection process
by looking at the number of observations, the decrease of which marks the incidence of firms’
failures.
Examination of table 2 (all 3,285 firms operating in January 1987) prompts a number of
considerations:
1) consistently with previous studies (see Section 1), Gibrat’s Law is rejected, with a  β1=0.847
significantly different from 1; smaller firms seem to grow faster than their larger counterparts.
Moreover, an initial larger size improves the likelihood of survival, although in a non-linear fashion
(this result is also consistent with previous empirical studies);
                                                
8 The test statistic is LR = 2 (log LU - log LR), where log LU and log LR are the log-likelihoods for the unrestricted and
restricted versions of the model, that is distributed as a χ2 statistic with 1 degree of freedom under the null hypothesis
that the restriction ρ = 0 is valid.
Table 2 – Estimates for all firms, basic model.
ALL FIRMS Growth equation. ln Si,t=β0+β1ln Si,t-1+εi,t            Selection equation      Pr(δi,t=1)=F(ln Si,t-1, ln Si,t-12, const)
1987-94 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
β1 0.847***(0.023)
0.959***
(0.005)
0.968***
(0.005)
0.973***
(0.007)
0.988***
(0.007)
0.986***
(0.008)
0.986***
(0.008)
0.982***
(0.011)Growth
Equation β0 0.360**(0.168)
0.183***
(0.011)
0.155***
(0.013)
0.091***
(0.017)
0.020
(0.018)
-0.006
(0.021)
-0.019
(0.020)
0.028
(0.030)
Wald Test β1=1 44.50*** 78.44*** 42.27*** 13.69*** 3.15* 3.07* 2.79* 2.58
α1 0.227***(0.040)
0.298***
(0.081)
0.411***
(0.050)
0.334***
(0.066)
0.319***
(0.062)
0.332***
(0.060)
0.374***
(0.064)
0.240***
(0.063)
α2 -0.025***(0.008)
-0.029**
(0.014)
-0.041***
(0.008)
-0.027***
(0.009)
-0.035***
(0.010)
-0.040***
(0.009)
-0.035***
(0.011)
-0.031***
(0.010)
Selection
Equation
α0 -0.066(0.047)
1.690***
(0.088)
0.758***
(0.060)
1.140***
(0.085)
1.072***
(0.084)
0.928***
(0.082)
0.826***
(0.084)
0.965***
(0.087)
ρ 0.467 0.054*** 0.109*** 0.049** 0.073 0.045 0.077 -0.012
λ 0.344 0.018 0.036 0.015 0.023 0.014 0.024 -0.004
Wald χ2 1360.97*** 42470.04*** 38275.57*** 17548.49*** 19762.35*** 15749.22*** 14505.59*** 7358.87***
log L -4372.26 -1343.91 -1897.21 -1180.25 -1340.00 -1346.80 -1233.71 -1251.28
Number of observations 3285 3285 3216 2893 2473 2564 2347 2149
Censored 1352 69 323 150 179 217 198 216
Uncensored 1933 3216 2893 2743 2564 2347 2149 1933
9Table 3– Estimates for all firms, basic model augmented with age.
ALL FIRMS Growth equation. ln Si,t=β0+β1ln Si,t-1+β2Agei,t+εi,t  Selection equation      Pr(δi,t=1)=F(lnSi,t-1, lnSi,t-12, Agei,t, Agei,t2, const)
1987-94 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
β1 0.893***(0.019)
0.974***
(0.005)
0.978***
(0.005)
0.980***
(0.007)
0.990***
(0.007)
0.988***
(0.008)
0.988***
(0.008)
0.982***
(0.011)
β2 -0.026***(0.003)
-0.009***
(0.001)
-0.007***
(0.001)
-0.005***
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.002)
Growth
Equation
β0 0.467***(0.116)
0.219***
(0.012)
0.187***
(0.014)
0.123***
(0.019)
0.033
(0.024)
0.002
(0.025)
-0.008
(0.028)
0.033
(0.039)
Wald Test β1=1 31.64*** 29.60*** 18.04*** 7.99*** 2.17 2.57 2.56 2.61
α1 0.200***(0.042)
0.274***
(0.079)
0.404***
(0.050)
0.337***
(0.066)
0.318***
(0.063)
0.326***
(0.060)
0.376***
(0.064)
0.236***
(0.063)
α2 -0.022***(0.008)
-0.027*
(0.014)
-0.041***
(0.008)
-0.028***
(0.010)
-0.037***
(0.010)
-0.038***
(0.010)
-0.035***
(0.011)
-0.031***
(0.010)
α3 0.037***(0.013)
0.032
(0.027)
0.021
(0.018)
-0.006
(0.027)
0.038
(0.026)
0.038
(0.026)
-0.010
(0.030)
0.026
(0.030)
α4 -0.001**(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
Selection
Equation
α0 -0.174***(0.058)
1.605***
(0.117)
0.671***
(0.087)
1.149***
(0.144)
0.842***
(0.146)
0.727***
(0.167)
0.890***
(0.209)
0.774***
(0.223)
ρ 0.450** 0.071*** 0.124*** 0.054** 0.092 0.055 0.081 -0.015
λ 0.326 0.023 0.041 0.016 0.029 0.017 0.026 -0.005
Wald χ2 2203.05*** 42929.42*** 38234.76*** 19860.07 22145.77*** 16578.43*** 17287.31 8007.68
log L -4331.79 -1309.29 -1879.30 -1167.77 -1336.34 -1345.34 -1223.25 -1250.80
Number of observations 3285 3285 3216 2893 2473 2564 2347 2149
Censored 1352 69 323 150 179 217 198 216
Uncensored 1933 3216 2893 2743 2564 2347 2149 1933
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Table 4 – Estimates for newborn firms, basic model.
NEWBORN FIRMS Growth equation. ln Si,t=β0+β1ln Si,t-1+εi,t            Selection equation      Pr(δi,t=1)=F(ln Si,t-1, ln Si,t-12, const)
1987-94 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
β1 0.725***(0.125)
0.929***
(0.023)
0.922***
(0.031)
0.951***
(0.022)
1.009***
(0.025)
0.979***
(0.029)
0.994***
(0.021)
0.982***
(0.042)Growth
Equation β0 0.405(0.470)
0.367***
(0.053)
0.263***
(0.079)
0.185***
(0.056)
0.038
(0.055)
0.027
(0.085)
-0.006
(0.063)
0.033
(0.106)
Wald Test β1=1 4.79** 9.85*** 6.12** 4.92** 0.13 0.54 0.08 0.19
α1 0.228(0.248)
7.249***
(0.674)
0.673**
(0.312)
0.670**
(0.341)
0.476*
(0.287)
0.317
(0.351)
0.512**
(0.226)
0.775**
(0.357)
α2 -0.071(0.052)
-1.092***
(0.102)
-0.077
(0.063)
-0.104**
(0.053)
-0.082*
(0.044)
-0.073
(0.052)
-0.081**
(0.035)
-0.142**
(0.063)
Selection
Equation
α0 -0.034(0.198)
2.010***
(0.417)
0.631**
(0.249)
0.714**
(0.335)
0.848**
(0.381)
1.203**
(0.487)
0.567**
(0.274)
0.482
(0.404)
ρ 0.860* 0.001 0.246** 0.225 -0.585 0.145* -0.928*** 0.327
λ 0.994 0.001 0.109 0.067 -0.178 0.059 -0.281 0.111
Wald χ2 33.40*** 1667.57*** 863.29*** 1817.77*** 1597.20 1175.47*** 2287.17*** 535.31***
log L -160.39 -60.02 -105.56 -51.80 -44.92 -65.26 -31.94 -44.34
Number of observations 122 122 121 107 97 88 81 71
Censored 60 1 14 10 9 7 10 9
Uncensored 62 121 107 97 88 81 71 62
Table 5 – Estimates for incumbent firms, basic model.
INCUMBENT FIRMS Growth equation. ln Si,t=β0+β1ln Si,t-1+εi,t            Selection equation      Pr(δi,t=1)=F(ln Si,t-1, ln Si,t-12, const)
1987-94 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
β1 0.854***(0.023)
0.962***
(0.005)
0.970***
(0.005)
0.974***
(0.008)
0.987***
(0.007)
0.987***
(0.008)
0.985***
(0.008)
0.982***
(0.012)Growth
Equation β0 0.371**(0.160)
0.171***
(0.012)
0.149***
(0.013)
0.086***
(0.017)
0.020
(0.019)
-0.008
(0.021)
-0.015
(0.020)
0.026
(0.032)
Wald Test β1=1 41.83*** 64.20*** 36.44*** 11.88*** 3.24* 2.77* 3.21* 2.38
α1 0.224***(0.042)
0.307***
(0.082)
0.403***
(0.051)
0.315***
(0.068)
0.316***
(0.064)
0.338***
(0.061)
0.361***
(0.066)
0.222***
(0.065)
α2 -0.023***(0.008)
-0.030**
(0.014)
-0.040***
(0.008)
-0.023**
(0.010)
-0.034***
(0.010)
-0.040***
(0.010)
-0.033***
(0.011)
-0.028***
(0.010)
Selection
Equation
α0 -0.063(0.049)
1.664***
(0.090)
0.764***
0.764
1.170***
(0.088)
1.081***
(0.087)
0.913***
(0.083)
0.850***
(0.086)
0.987***
(0.090)
ρ 0.390 0.050*** 0.100*** 0.047** 0.080 0.044 0.080 -0.018
λ 0.285 0.017 0.033 0.014 0.025 0.014 0.025 -0.006
Wald χ2 1420.84*** 41558.40*** 38032.74*** 16802.53*** 18833.90*** 15019.50*** 13898.11*** 6977.67***
log L -4195.29 -1265.31 -1773.78 -1124.22 -1292.87 -1273.91 -1185.92 -1204.72
Number of observations 3163 3163 3095 2786 2646 2476 2265 2078
Censored 1292 68 309 140 170 211 188 207
Uncensored 1871 3095 2786 2646 2476 2265 2078 1871
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Table 6 – Estimates for incumbent firms, basic model augmented with age.
INCUMBENT FIRMS Growth equation. ln Si,t=β0+β1ln Si,t-1+β2Agei,t+εi,t  Selection equation      Pr(δi,t=1)=F(lnSi,t-1, lnSi,t-12, Agei,t+Agei,t2, const)
1987-94 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
β1 0.897***(0.019)
0.976***
(0.005)
0.980***
(0.005)
0.981***
(0.007)
0.989***
(0.007)
0.988***
(0.008)
0.987***
(0.008)
0.982***
(0.011)
β2 -0.024***(0.003)
-0.009***
(0.001)
-0.007***
(0.001)
-0.005***
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.002)
Growth
Equation
β0 0.469***(0.113)
0.206***
(0.013)
0.183***
(0.014)
0.119***
(0.020)
0.032
(0.025)
0.000
(0.026)
-0.001
(0.029)
0.030
(0.041)
Wald Test β1=1 28.67*** 24.34*** 14.13*** 6.95*** 2.38 2.37 2.84* 2.45
α1 0.201***(0.042)
0.273***
(0.080)
0.395***
(0.051)
0.321***
(0.068)
0.315***
(0.064)
0.331***
(0.061)
0.364***
(0.066)
0.219***
(0.065)
α2 -0.022***(0.008)
-0.027**
(0.014)
-0.040***
(0.008)
-0.025**
(0.010)
-0.036***
(0.010)
-0.038***
(0.010)
-0.033***
(0.011)
-0.028***
(0.011)
α3 0.035***(0.014)
0.050*
(0.028)
0.029
(0.020)
-0.022
(0.029)
0.037
(0.027)
0.045
(0.028)
-0.021
(0.032)
0.025
(0.031)
α4 -0.001*(0.001)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.002*
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
Selection
Equation
α0 -0.174***(0.064)
1.521***
(0.126)
0.642***
(0.095)
1.252***
(0.159)
0.849***
(0.157)
0.666***
(0.180)
0.992
(0.227)
0.805***
(0.240)
ρ 0.392** 0.070*** 0.123*** 0.049** 0.097 0.055 0.085* -0.024
λ 0.282 0.023 -1.130 0.015 0.031 0.017 0.027 -0.008
Wald χ2 2167.32*** 41738.56*** 37736.36*** 18992.16*** 21237.49*** 15739.73** 16520.88*** 7499.94***
log L -4160.56 -1235.60 -1755.35 -1113.08 -1289.84 -1272.29 -1185.11 -1204.40
Number of observations 3163 3163 3095 2786 2646 2476 2265 2078
Censored 1292 68 309 140 170 211 188 207
Uncensored 1871 3095 2786 2646 2476 2265 2078 1871
2) β1 is not only closer to 1 in the yearly estimates (this being simply a consequence of the
expected close similarity in size in two adjacent years), but this coefficient is increasing over time
and not statistically different from 1 in the last periods. Overall, convergence to Gibrat-like
behavior emerges. While these results remain virtually unchanged when a dummy for newborn
firms is included,9 some further considerations arise when one looks at table 3, which takes the age
variable fully into account.
3) Consistently with previous studies, the inverse relationship between age and growth and the
positive link between age and survival are both confirmed over the entire period. Yet age seems to
lose its role in the second sub-period (1990-1994).
4) As in the previous estimates, Gibrat’s Law is rejected in general, but some convergence
towards the validity of the Law occurs over time. In this table the Wald test does not reject the
hypothesis of  β1=1 from 1990-91: not surprisingly, the departure from Gibrat's Law is confined to
the first three years, when the population of firms is still strongly characterized by the presence of
small transient firms and when the sample selection is particularly significant (the null ρ = 0 is
rejected).10
Before our sample is split into incumbent and newborn firms, a preliminary conclusion can be
drawn. Gibrat’s Law does not hold for the entire population of 3,285 firms and over the entire
period, because smaller and younger firms exhibit a higher propensity to grow. Nevertheless,
allowing for market selection through failures, the core of survivors display Gibrat-like behavior;
that is, within the sub-population of larger and more efficient firms, Gibrat’s Law seems to hold and
relative size and age loose their roles. In other words, it is plausible to conclude that the 1,933
surviving firms exhibit (and will probably exhibit in the subsequent periods for which data are not
available) growth patterns consistent with the Law of Proportionate Effect. This result is even more
marked if attention is turned to newborn firms, where market selection through early failure is even
more dramatic.
Table 4 prompts the following comments:
5) As in the previous tables, Gibrat’s Law is rejected over the entire period. Here the departure
from the Law is larger than in the previous cases, with a lower β1=0.725. Yet, β1 is increasing over
time and becomes not significantly different from 1 from the fourth period on.
                                                
9 The coefficient of this dummy variable is significantly different from zero, thereby pointing up differences in growth
patterns between newborn and incumbent firms. The results are not given here, but are available on request.
10 In this case, too, the inclusion of a dummy for newborn firms does not change the results.
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6) Unlike in the previous tables, initial size seems to play a minor role in determining the
likelihood of survival (probably due to the fact that almost all the new entries enter the market at a
sub-optimal scale).
Hence, even within the particular population of newborn firms, smaller firms grow faster in the
years immediately after entry, but then the reshaped population of surviving firms tends to behave
in a Gibrat-like way. In other words, a post-entry size adjustment occurs immediately after entry
when the very sub-optimal firms try to converge to the average entry size; this process ends within
the first 3 years after entry.
Turning to incumbent firms alone, not surprisingly we find further confirmation for the previous
results (see table 5 and table 6 with the additional age variable).
7) Within incumbent firms, Gibrat’s Law is again rejected in general, but it is confirmed once
market selection has reshaped the original population in favor of the larger and more efficient firms.
8) Unlike in the case of newborn firms, initial size and age continue to be good predictors of
incumbents’ likelihood of survival.
4. Conclusions
The main finding of this study on the Italian Radio, TV & Telecommunications equipment industry
is that the rejection of Gibrat’s Law, common to most previous empirical research and also found
here, may be due to market dynamics and selection, that is, to the entry process and the failure of
transient smaller firms. Indeed, whilst we find that Gibrat’s Law must be rejected over a seven-year
period in which both incumbent and newborn firms are considered, for both the sub-populations
convergence towards a Gibrat-like behavior over time can be detected. In other words, the reshaped
and smaller population of surviving firms resulting from market selection exhibits, within itself,
patterns of growth consistent with Gibrat’s Law.
Referring to the list of questions proposed in Section 2, we can conclude that Gibrat’s Law is
rejected in general terms (question a), but this rejection is due to the presence of a “fringe” of
smaller and younger firms which are gradually selected out by market mechanisms. In other words,
over time, some sort of shakeout (see Klepper and Miller, 1995) occurs and the remaining “core” of
surviving firms tends to behave according to the Law of Proportionate Effect (question c11).
This process is even more marked among new entries (question b), since the fringe of sub-
optimal scale firms is relatively larger. This is why the overall seven-year β1 is lower than for
                                                
11 This evidence is consistent with theoretical models of entry and market selection with learning (see Jovanovic,
1982; Pakes and Ericson, 1998; Cabral, 1997).
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incumbent firms. Nevertheless, among newborn firms as well, there is evident convergence towards
Gibrat’s Law (question c).
In sum, the passage of time enables the market “to clean” a given population of firms12 and the
surviving industrial core (mature, larger, well-established and most efficient firms) does not seem to
depart from a Gibrat-like pattern of growth. This result reconciles the recent literature with the very
early studies on Gibrat’s Law (see Hart and Prais, 1956; Simon and Bonini, 1958; Hymer and
Pashigian, 1962) which tended to confirm the Law on the basis of samples comprising very large,
old and well-established firms.
If these results are confirmed by future research, Gibrat’s Law should no longer be considered a
representation of overall industrial dynamics, but rather as a way to describe the growth behavior of
mature, large and well-established manufacturing firms.
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